Publication Type
Journal Article
Version
publishedVersion
Publication Date
12-2011
Abstract
In his seminal work Moral Notions, Julius Kovesi presents a novel account of concept formation. At the heart of this account is a distinction between what he terms the material element and the formal element of concepts. This paper elucidates his distinction in detail and contrasts it with other distinctions such as form-matter, universal-particular, genus-difference, necessary-sufficient, and open texture-closed texture. We situate Kovesi’s distinction within his general philosophical method, outlining his views on concept formation in general and explain how his theory of concept formation is applied in moral philosophy.
Keywords
Kovesi, Fact, Value, Morality, Concepts, Family resemblance
Discipline
Philosophy
Research Areas
Humanities
Publication
Philosophia
Volume
39
Issue
4
First Page
699
Last Page
720
ISSN
0048-3893
Identifier
10.1007/s11406-011-9305-x
Publisher
Springer Verlag
Citation
MOONEY, T. Brian, NOWACKI, Mark, & WILLIAMS, John N..(2011). Kovesi and the Formal and Material Elements of Concepts. Philosophia, 39(4), 699-720.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_research/978
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.
Additional URL
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-011-9305-x