p, and I have Absolutely No Justification for Believing that p: The Incoherence of Bayesianism
Publication Type
Working Paper
Version
publishedVersion
Publication Date
10-2005
Abstract
Bayesianism tells a story about the epistemic trajectory of an ideally rational agent. The agent begins with a ‘prior’ probability function; thereafter, it conditionalizes on its evidence as it comes in. Consider, then, such an agent at the very beginning of its trajectory. It is ideally rational, but completely ignorant of which world is actual. Let us call this agent ‘superbaby’.1 We show that superbaby is committed to sincerely asserting propositions of the form [p and I am not justified in believing that p].
Discipline
Philosophy
Research Areas
Humanities
First Page
1
Last Page
30
Publisher
Singapore Management University, SMU Social Sciences and Humanities Working Paper Series, Paper No. 07-2005
City or Country
Singapore
Citation
WILLIAMS, John N. and HAJEK, Alan, "p, and I have Absolutely No Justification for Believing that p: The Incoherence of Bayesianism" (2005). Research Collection School of Social Sciences. Paper 71.
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_research/71
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_research/71
Copyright Owner and License
Authors
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.