Publication Type
Journal Article
Version
acceptedVersion
Publication Date
2-2006
Abstract
For Moore, it is a paradox that although I would be absurd in asserting that (it is raining but I don’t believe it is) or that (it is raining but I believe it isn’t), such assertions might be true. But I would be also absurd in judging that the contents of such assertions are true. I argue for the strategy of explaining the absurdity of Moorean assertion in terms of conscious Moorean belief. Only in this way may the pathology of Moorean absurdity be adequately explained in terms of self-contradiction. David Rosenthal disagrees with this strategy. Ironically, his higher-order thought account has the resources to fulfil it. Indeed once modified and supplemented, it compares favourably with Brentano’s rival account of conscious belief.
Keywords
Moore's paradox, belief, absurdity
Discipline
Philosophy
Research Areas
Humanities
Publication
Philosophical Studies
Volume
127
Issue
3
First Page
383
Last Page
414
ISSN
0031-8116
Identifier
10.1007/s11098-004-7826-x
Publisher
Springer Verlag
Citation
WILLIAMS, John N..(2006). Moore's Paradoxes and Conscious Belief. Philosophical Studies, 127(3), 383-414.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_research/43
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.
Additional URL
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-004-7826-x