Publication Type
Journal Article
Version
acceptedVersion
Publication Date
11-2024
Abstract
Paul Bloom has famously argued against the need for empathy in clinicians, while Sally Dalton-Brown has argued that AI need not be capable of empathy to be a good carer. In this paper, the capacity for AI to substitute for human clinicians is assessed from a bioethical perspective, primarily through the evaluation of the arguments put forth by Dalton-Brown and Bloom concerning empathy in healthcare. In opposition to both Bloom and Dalton-Brown, this paper argues that (1) empathy is essential to providing good care or deep care (that is, care that goes beyond the mere fulfilment of medical tasks), (2) deep care is a significant aspect of healthcare and yields important benefits, and (3) AI’s lack of capacity for empathy and mutual recognition prevents it from being able to provide deep care for patients, and for this reason, we ought to be extremely cautious about considering allowing AI to ultimately replace human healthcare providers.
Keywords
Technology, Ethics, AI, Substitutive technology, Heathcare
Discipline
Artificial Intelligence and Robotics | Public Health
Research Areas
Humanities
Areas of Excellence
Digital transformation
Publication
AI and Ethics
Volume
4
First Page
1507
Last Page
1518
ISSN
2730-5953
Identifier
10.1007/s43681-023-00347-9
Publisher
Springer
Citation
HIRMIZ, Rand.(2024). Against the substitutive approach to AI in healthcare. AI and Ethics, 4, 1507-1518.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_research/4286
Copyright Owner and License
Authors
Creative Commons License

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.
Additional URL
https://doi.org/10.1007/s43681-023-00347-9