Publication Type

Journal Article

Version

submittedVersion

Publication Date

8-2025

Abstract

I seek to vindicate heteronomous shame: shame that one experiences in response to a judgment from another that one does not accept. I suggest that such experiences are instances of interpersonal shame. This is shame that involves a sensitivity to interpersonal ideals, whose instantiation depends partly on the attitudes of others. I defend the importance of such shame by showing how vulnerability to others is a constitutive part of rich interpersonal relationships. The account both casts light on and vindicates the heteronomous shame that is pervasive among marginalised and oppressed groups. Such shame is not irrational but involves an accurate apprehension that misrecognition on the part of others has paralysed their ability to act and so degraded an important part of their identity.

Keywords

Shame, Social Shame, Heteronomous Shame, Interpersonal Relationships, Friendship, Recognition, Misrecognition

Discipline

Philosophy

Research Areas

Humanities

Publication

American Philosophical Quarterly

Volume

62

Issue

3

First Page

219

Last Page

232

ISSN

0003-0481

Identifier

10.5406/21521123.62.3.02

Publisher

University of Illinois Press

Additional URL

https://doi.org/10.5406/21521123.62.3.02

Included in

Philosophy Commons

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