Publication Type

Journal Article

Version

acceptedVersion

Publication Date

3-2022

Abstract

We commonly appeal to emotions to explain human behaviour: we seek comfort out of grief, we threaten someone in anger and we hide in fear. According to the standard Humean analysis, intentional action is always explained with reference to a belief-desire pair. According to recent consensus, however, emotions have independent motivating force apart from beliefs and desires, and supplant them when explaining emotional action. In this paper I provide a systematic framework for thinking about the motivational structure of emotion and show how it is consistent with the Humean analysis. On this picture, emotions are not reducible to beliefs and desires, instead their primary motivational force comes from their role as modulators of desires—they control the strength of our occurrent desires. Emotions therefore motivate actions through the belief-desire system instead of overriding it.

Keywords

Emotion, desire, motivation, action, Motivational theory of action, Humeanism, belief-desire psychology, Humean theory of motivation, action tendency

Discipline

Philosophy | Philosophy of Mind

Research Areas

Psychology

Publication

Philosophical Studies

Volume

179

Issue

3

First Page

855

Last Page

878

ISSN

0031-8116

Identifier

10.1007/s11098-021-01697-y

Publisher

Springer

Copyright Owner and License

Authors

Additional URL

https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-021-01697-y

Share

COinS