Publication Type

Journal Article

Version

acceptedVersion

Publication Date

8-2022

Abstract

Contextualists and Subject Sensitive Invariantists often cite the knowledge norm of assertion as part of their argument. They claim that the knowledge norms in conjunction with our intuitions about when a subject is properly asserting in low or high stakes contexts provides strong evidence that what counts as knowledge depends on practical factors. In this paper, I present new data to suggest they are mistaken in the way they think about cases involving high and low stakes and I show how insensitive invariantists can explain the data. I exploit recent work done on the distinction between flouting a norm and being blamed for that violation to formulate a rigorous theory of rational expected blameworthiness that allows insensitive invariantists to explain the data cited.

Keywords

Knowledge Norm of Assertion, Contextualism, Pragmatic Encroachment, Insensitive Invariantism, Stakes

Discipline

Philosophy

Research Areas

Humanities

Publication

Erkenntnis

Volume

87

Issue

4

First Page

1501

Last Page

1519

ISSN

0165-0106

Identifier

10.1007/s10670-020-00259-8

Publisher

Springer

Copyright Owner and License

Authors

Additional URL

https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-020-00259-8

Included in

Philosophy Commons

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