Publication Type
Journal Article
Version
acceptedVersion
Publication Date
3-2021
Abstract
According to the perceptual theory of emotions, emotions are perceptions of evaluative properties. The account has recently faced a barrage of criticism recently by critics who point out varies disanalogies between emotion and paradigmatic perceptual experiences. What many theorists fail to note however, is that many of the disanalogies that have been raised to exclude emotions from being perceptual states that represent evaluative properties have also been used to exclude high-level properties from appearing in the content of perception. This suggests that (1) emotions are perceptions of high level properties and (2) perceptual theorists can marshal the arguments used by proponents of high-level perception to defend the perceptual theory. This paper therefore defends an account of emotion as high-level perception.
Keywords
Emotion, Perception, Perceptual Theory of Emotion, High-level Perception, Evaluative Perception
Discipline
Philosophy
Research Areas
Psychology
Publication
Synthese
Volume
199
Issue
3-4
First Page
7181
Last Page
7201
ISSN
0039-7857
Identifier
10.1007/s11229-021-03109-4
Publisher
Springer
Citation
YIP, Brandon.(2021). Emotion as high level perception. Synthese, 199(3-4), 7181-7201.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_research/4132
Copyright Owner and License
Authors
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.
Additional URL
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-021-03109-4
