Publication Type
Book Chapter
Version
acceptedVersion
Publication Date
2-2006
Abstract
Hungary has a particularly complicated electoral system: a type of mixed system that incorporates three tiers of seat allocation, the use of a proportional allocation formula, and the allocation of a number of seats by a two-round system in single-member constituencies. Examination of the strategic incentives facing parties explains some surprising outcomes, such as the majoritarian impact on the party system and the possibility of the second strongest party in votes becoming the strongest in seats. Despite its complexity and alleged shortcomings, it is unlikely to be abandoned; it serves the interests of the largest parties, and these effectively wield a veto over electoral reform.
Keywords
Electoral reform, Hungarian politics, Majoritarianism, Mixed system, Proportional representation, Two-round system
Discipline
Eastern European Studies | Political Science
Research Areas
Political Science
Publication
The politics of electoral systems
Editor
Michael Gallagher & Paul Mitchell
First Page
231
Last Page
252
ISBN
9780199257560
Identifier
10.1093/0199257566.003.0011
Publisher
Oxford University Press
City or Country
Oxford
Citation
BENOIT, Kenneth. (2006). Hungary: Holding back the tiers. In The politics of electoral systems (pp. 231-252). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_research/4020
Copyright Owner and License
Authors
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.
Additional URL
https://doi.org/10.1093/0199257566.003.0011