The value of knowledge
Publication Type
Journal Article
Publication Date
12-2014
Abstract
In this paper I make the case that we should reject an argument that even knowledge of pointless truths has pro tanto final value. The argument draws on Greco’s virtue epistemological account of knowledge, according to which knowledge is an achievement and achievements have final value in virtue of being constitutive of the good life. I argue for my position by drawing on a case of knowledge of a pointless truth unlike previous cases of pointless truths discussed in the literature. This is a case in which knowledge of a pointless truth is very cheaply gained, and so it is a case in which the disvalue of the cost of gaining the knowledge cannot plausibly outweigh the supposed pro tanto final value of knowledge
Keywords
argument, rejection, Greco, virtue epistemology, knowledge, final value, good life, pointless truth, cheaply gained, disvalue, cost
Discipline
Epistemology
Research Areas
Humanities
Publication
Dialogue and Universalism
Volume
24
Issue
3
First Page
84
Last Page
88
ISSN
1234-5792
Identifier
10.5840/du201424363
Citation
RYAN, Shane.(2014). The value of knowledge. Dialogue and Universalism, 24(3), 84-88.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_research/3717
Additional URL
http://doi.org/10.5840/du201424363