A virtue theoretic ethics of intellectual agency
Publication Type
Journal Article
Publication Date
8-2022
Abstract
There is a well-established literature on the ethics of belief. Our beliefs, however, are just one aspect of our intellectual lives with which epistemology should be concerned. I make the case that epistemologists should be concerned with an ethics of intellectual agency rather than the narrower category of ethics of belief. Various species of normativity, epistemic, moral, and so on, that may be relevant to the ethics of belief are laid out. An account adapted from virtue ethics for an ethics that goes beyond the ethics of belief is defended. The main claim advanced here is that we should act as the virtuous agent would characteristically act in the circumstances. This claim is supported with reference to a number of examples, as well as considerations informing virtue ethics. An acknowledged feature of this account is that it provides limited guidance regarding right action in intellectual agency. While the account draws on virtue responsibilism to offer guidance, the case is made that it’s a mistake to think that an account in this area can provide a successful decision procedure.
Keywords
ethics of belief, epistemology, intellectual agency, normativity, ethics of intellectual agency, virtue ethics, virtuous agent, virtue responsibilism, decision procedure
Discipline
Epistemology
Research Areas
Humanities
Publication
Logos and Episteme: An International Journal of Epistemology
Volume
12
Issue
4
First Page
437
Last Page
452
ISSN
2069-0533
Identifier
10.5840/logos-episteme202112434
Publisher
Institutul European
Citation
RYAN, Shane.(2022). A virtue theoretic ethics of intellectual agency. Logos and Episteme: An International Journal of Epistemology, 12(4), 437-452.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_research/3712
Additional URL
http://doi.org/10.5840/logos-episteme202112434