Paternalism: An analysis

Publication Type

Journal Article

Publication Date

6-2016

Abstract

In this article I argue for a particular analysis of paternalism. I start by examining Dworkin's conditions for the paternalist act and make a case for alternative conditions. I argue that the paternalist actor acts irrespective of what she believes the wishes of the target of her action are and the paternalist actor acts because she has a positive epistemic standing that the act may or will improve the welfare of the target of her action. I also argue that it is consistent with my analysis that there are paternalist acts that don't interfere with the autonomy of the object of the paternalist act. I describe some such acts and make the case that such acts, when they are paternalist acts, may be morally permissible and outline the factors that bear on their permissibility. Finally I locate my analysis in the literature by comparing it to a number of other accounts.

Keywords

paternalism, moral philosophy, ethical analysis, autonomy, welfare, moral permissibility, non-interference, Dworkin, epistemic standing, moral literature

Discipline

Philosophy

Research Areas

Humanities

Publication

Utilitas

Volume

28

Issue

2

First Page

123

Last Page

135

ISSN

0953-8208

Identifier

10.1017/S0953820815000254

Publisher

Cambridge University Press

Additional URL

http://doi.org/10.1017/S0953820815000254

This document is currently not available here.

Share

COinS