Paternalism: An analysis
Publication Type
Journal Article
Publication Date
6-2016
Abstract
In this article I argue for a particular analysis of paternalism. I start by examining Dworkin's conditions for the paternalist act and make a case for alternative conditions. I argue that the paternalist actor acts irrespective of what she believes the wishes of the target of her action are and the paternalist actor acts because she has a positive epistemic standing that the act may or will improve the welfare of the target of her action. I also argue that it is consistent with my analysis that there are paternalist acts that don't interfere with the autonomy of the object of the paternalist act. I describe some such acts and make the case that such acts, when they are paternalist acts, may be morally permissible and outline the factors that bear on their permissibility. Finally I locate my analysis in the literature by comparing it to a number of other accounts.
Keywords
paternalism, moral philosophy, ethical analysis, autonomy, welfare, moral permissibility, non-interference, Dworkin, epistemic standing, moral literature
Discipline
Philosophy
Research Areas
Humanities
Publication
Utilitas
Volume
28
Issue
2
First Page
123
Last Page
135
ISSN
0953-8208
Identifier
10.1017/S0953820815000254
Publisher
Cambridge University Press
Citation
RYAN, Shane.(2016). Paternalism: An analysis. Utilitas, 28(2), 123-135.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_research/3701
Additional URL
http://doi.org/10.1017/S0953820815000254