Publication Type

Journal Article

Version

publishedVersion

Publication Date

7-2019

Abstract

I lay out the challenge posed by testimonial knowledge in young children to virtue reliabilist accounts of knowledge. In particular, I examine accounts from Greco and Pritchard and argue that those accounts are too demanding. More specifically, I make the case that young children can have testimonial knowledge without meeting the ability requirements claimed by Greco and Pritchard. As a virtue theoretic alternative, I argue that an agent's belief must be epistemically virtuous, but that this may sometimes involve belief from a trait rather than an ability.

Discipline

Political Science

Research Areas

Political Science

Publication

South African Journal of Philosophy

Volume

38

Issue

3

First Page

263

Last Page

272

ISSN

0258-0136

Identifier

10.1080/02580136.2019.1648122

Publisher

Taylor and Francis Group

Additional URL

https://doi.org/10.1080/02580136.2019.1648122

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