Publication Type
Journal Article
Version
submittedVersion
Publication Date
7-2022
Abstract
Although effective bureaucracies are seen as key for service provision in developing states, we still have limited explanations for their emergence. I argue getting these institutions right is a political, rather than technical, challenge based on a set of theoretical predictions for reform outcomes acknowledging the interaction between a state’s political vulnerability and degree of bureaucratic independence. I apply these predictions to a controlled comparison of irrigation sector reforms in three Asian countries. The results demonstrate that the success of institutional reforms necessary to implement policies is contingent on both the degree of vulnerability experienced as well as the extent to which the bureaucracy can influence the policy-making process. In states with highly independent bureaucracies, reforms falter or are reversed due to bureaucratic resistance. This highlights the impact of politics in shaping second-generation reforms and suggest that researchers should pay greater attention to the role bureaucracy plays in forging institutions.
Keywords
Second-generation reforms, Institutional reform, Bureaucracy, Southeast Asia
Discipline
Comparative Politics | South and Southeast Asian Languages and Societies
Research Areas
Sociology; Political Science
Publication
Asian Politics and Policy
Volume
14
Issue
3
First Page
351
Last Page
373
ISSN
1943-0779
Identifier
https://doi.org/10.1111/aspp.12653
Publisher
Wiley: 24 months
Citation
RICKS, Jacob.(2022). The politics of institutional reform: Vulnerability and bureaucratic independence in Asian agriculture. Asian Politics and Policy, 14(3), 351-373.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_research/3673
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This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.