Publication Type

Journal Article

Version

acceptedVersion

Publication Date

12-2022

Abstract

Many philosophers appeal to the “fallacy of approximation”, or “problem of second best”. However, despite the pervasiveness of such appeals, there has been only a single attempt to provide a systematic account of what the fallacy is. We identify the shortcomings of this account and propose a better one in its place. Our account not only captures all the contexts in which approximation-based reasoning occurs but also systematically explains the several different ways in which it can be in error.

Keywords

fallacy of approximation, problem of second best, ranking, value theory, philosophy of economics, reasoning, ideal theory

Discipline

Economic Theory | Philosophy

Research Areas

Economic Theory; Political Science; Humanities

Publication

Erkenntnis

First Page

1

Last Page

20

ISSN

0165-0106

Identifier

10.1007/s10670-022-00642-7

Additional URL

http://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-022-00642-7

Share

COinS