Publication Type

Journal Article

Version

publishedVersion

Publication Date

1-2014

Abstract

This paper examines Linda Zagzebski’s (2012) account of rationality, as set out in her rich, wide-ranging, and important book, Epistemic Authority: A Theory of Trust, Authority, and Autonomy in Belief. We briefly describe the account that she offers and then consider its plausibility. In particular, in the first section we argue that a number of Zagzebski’s claims with regard to rationality require more support than she offers for them. Moreover, in the second section, we contend that far from offering Zagzebski a quick way of dealing with radical scepticism, her account of rationality actually seems to be particularly vulnerable to this problem.

Discipline

Epistemology | Logic and Foundations of Mathematics

Publication

European Journal for Philosophy of Religion

Volume

6

Issue

4

First Page

39

Last Page

46

ISSN

1689-8311

Identifier

10.24204/ejpr.v6i4.143

Publisher

European Journal for Philosophy of Religion

Additional URL

http://doi.org/10.24204/ejpr.v6i4.143

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