Publication Type

Journal Article

Version

submittedVersion

Publication Date

6-2022

Abstract

What determines states’ willingness to institutionalize alliances? Contrary to conventional emphasis on system-level conditions, we argue that states pay close attention to the domestic political consequences of institutionalizing alliances. This is particularly true for unequal allies. Client regimes are disproportionately sensitive to alliance design, as it affects patron allies’ ability to influence their military, distribute finance and arms, and legitimate preferred political groups. Two factors—power consolidation and political compatibility—determine whether the client views alliance institutionalization as complementary or conflictual with regime survival. The divergent alliance designs North and South Korea chose after the Korean War support our argument. An unresolved power consolidation process forced Kim Il-Sung to refuse formalizing the wartime alliance with the PRC, and Kim concluded a minimal treaty in 1961 after consolidating his power. In contrast, rapid consolidation left Rhee Syngman little to fear from continuing the highly institutionalized wartime alliance arrangement with the United States, which accepted his authority in the south. Our findings have important implications for alliance design, intra-alliance politics, and civil–military relations.

Keywords

alliance institutionalization, civil-military relations, asymmetric alliance, alliance design, Korean Peninsula

Discipline

Asian Studies | International Relations | Political Science

Research Areas

Political Science

Publication

Journal of Global Security Studies

Volume

7

Issue

2

First Page

1

Last Page

18

ISSN

2057-3189

Identifier

10.1093/jogss/ogac001

Publisher

Oxford University Press (OUP): Policy F - Oxford Open Option D

Copyright Owner and License

Authors

Additional URL

https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogac001

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