Publication Type

Book Chapter

Version

submittedVersion

Publication Date

12-2020

Abstract

In traditional consequentialism the good is position-neutral. A single evaluative ranking of states of affairs is correct for everyone, everywhere regardless of their positions. Recently, position-relative forms of consequentialism have been developed. These allow for the correct rankings of states to depend on connections that hold between the state being evaluated and the position of the evaluator. For example, perhaps being an agent who acts in a certain state requires me to rank that state differently from someone else who lacks this connection. In this chapter several different kinds of position-relative rankings related to agents, times, physical locations, and possible worlds are explored. Arguments for and against adopting a position-relative axiology are examined, and it is suggested that position-relative consequentialism is a promising moral theory that has been underestimated.

Keywords

consequentialism, agent-relative, agent-neutral, value, axiology, time-relative, patient-relative, world-relative, special duties, deontic constraints

Discipline

Philosophy

Research Areas

Humanities

Publication

The Oxford handbook of consequentialism

Editor

D. W. Portmore

First Page

46

Last Page

66

ISBN

9780190905323

Identifier

10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190905323.013.6

Publisher

Oxford University Press

City or Country

New York

Copyright Owner and License

Authors

Additional URL

https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190905323.013.6

Included in

Philosophy Commons

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