Publication Type
Book Chapter
Version
submittedVersion
Publication Date
12-2020
Abstract
In traditional consequentialism the good is position-neutral. A single evaluative ranking of states of affairs is correct for everyone, everywhere regardless of their positions. Recently, position-relative forms of consequentialism have been developed. These allow for the correct rankings of states to depend on connections that hold between the state being evaluated and the position of the evaluator. For example, perhaps being an agent who acts in a certain state requires me to rank that state differently from someone else who lacks this connection. In this chapter several different kinds of position-relative rankings related to agents, times, physical locations, and possible worlds are explored. Arguments for and against adopting a position-relative axiology are examined, and it is suggested that position-relative consequentialism is a promising moral theory that has been underestimated.
Keywords
consequentialism, agent-relative, agent-neutral, value, axiology, time-relative, patient-relative, world-relative, special duties, deontic constraints
Discipline
Philosophy
Research Areas
Humanities
Publication
The Oxford handbook of consequentialism
Editor
D. W. Portmore
First Page
46
Last Page
66
ISBN
9780190905323
Identifier
10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190905323.013.6
Publisher
Oxford University Press
City or Country
New York
Citation
1
Copyright Owner and License
Authors
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.
Additional URL
https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190905323.013.6