Publication Type
Working Paper
Version
publishedVersion
Publication Date
10-2003
Abstract
G. E. Moore observed that to for me to assert, “I went to the pictures last Tuesday but I don’t believe that I did” would be “absurd” (1942: 543). Over half a century later, the explanation of the nature of this absurdity remains problematic. Such assertions are unlike semantically odd Liar-type assertions such as “What I’m now saying is not true” since my Moorean assertion might be true: you may consistently imagine a situation in which I went to the pictures last Tuesday but fail to believe that I did. Moreover, if you contradict my assertion then your words, “If he went to the pictures last Tuesday then he believes he did” do not express a necessary truth1. Nonetheless it remains absurd of me to assert that p and I don’t believe that p. It seems no less absurd of me to silently judge that p and I don’t believe that p2. But why should it be absurd of me to assert something that might be true of me? Why should it be absurd of me to believe something that might be true of me?
Discipline
Philosophy
Research Areas
Humanities
Volume
01-2003
First Page
1
Last Page
36
Publisher
SMU Social Sciences and Humanities Working Paper Series, 1-2003
City or Country
Singapore
Citation
WILLIAMS, John N., "Moorean Absurdity and Conscious Belief" (2003). Research Collection School of Social Sciences. Paper 3.
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_research/3
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_research/3
Copyright Owner and License
Author
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.
Comments
Published in Philosophical Studies, 2006, 127(3), 383-414. doi: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-004-7826-x