Explaining moral variety

Publication Type

Journal Article

Publication Date

12-1994

Abstract

Reflection on the variety of forms of social life has long been a source of moral skepticism. The thought that there are many radically different social systems, each of which colors the way its members think about moral and political questions, has been thought by many moral philosophers to undermine confidence in our belief that our way of looking at-or even posing-these questions is the correct one. The fact of cultural variety is held to reduce, if not eliminate altogether, the possibility of moral criticism of the practices of other societies. This thought is not a recent one; it is implicit, for example, in an observation made in David Hume's “A Dialogue,” when he writes:There are no manners so innocent or reasonable, but may be rendered odious or ridiculous, if measured by a standard, unknown to the persons; especially, if you employ a little art or eloquence, in aggravating some circumstances, and extenuating others, as best suits the purpose of your discourse.

Discipline

Political Science | Social Policy

Research Areas

Political Science

Publication

Social Philosophy and Policy

Volume

11

Issue

1

First Page

1

Last Page

21

ISSN

0265-0525

Identifier

10.1017/S026505250000426X

Publisher

Cambridge University Press (CUP): HSS Journals - No Cambridge Open

Additional URL

https://doi.org/10.1017/S026505250000426X

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