Publication Type

Journal Article

Version

publishedVersion

Publication Date

4-2019

Abstract

The 2016 decision to deploy Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) to South Korea has generated multitude of intensely politicized issues and has proved highly controversial. This has made it challenging to alleviate, let alone clarify, points of analytical and policy tensions. We instead disaggregate and revisit two fundamental questions. One is whether THAAD could really defend South Korea from North Korean missiles. We challenge the conventional “qualified optimism” by giving analytical primacy to three countermeasures available to defeat THAAD–use of decoys, tumbling and spiral motion, and outnumbering. These countermeasures are relatively inexpensive to create but exceedingly difficult to offset. Second, we assess the optimal way to ensure South Korean national security against North Korean missiles. By examining the balance of capability and issues of credibility/commitment, we show that the US extended deterrence by punishment remains plentiful and sufficiently credible even without enhancing the current defense capability.

Keywords

Security dilemma, ballistic missile defense (BMD), terminal high altitude area defense (THAAD), extended deterrence, North Korea

Discipline

Asian Studies | International Relations | Military, War, and Peace

Research Areas

Political Science

Publication

Contemporary Security Policy

Volume

20

Issue

2

First Page

165

Last Page

192

ISSN

1352-3260

Identifier

10.1080/13523260.2018.1558750

Publisher

Taylor & Francis (Routledge): SSH Titles

Additional URL

https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2018.1558750

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