Publication Type
Journal Article
Version
publishedVersion
Publication Date
8-1987
Abstract
The preface paradox strikes us as puzzling because we feel that if a person holds a set of inconsistent beliefs, i.e. beliefs such that at least one of them must be correct, then he should give at least one of them up. Equally, if a person's belief is rational, then he has a right to hold it. Yet the preface example is prima facie a case in which a person holds an inconsistent set of beliefs each of which is rational, and thus a case in which that person has a duty to relinquish what he has a right to keep.
Discipline
Philosophy
Research Areas
Humanities
Publication
Theoria
Volume
53
Issue
2-3
First Page
121
Last Page
140
ISSN
1755-2567
Identifier
10.1111/j.1755-2567.1987.tb00706.x
Publisher
Wiley
Citation
WILLIAMS, John N..(1987). The Preface Paradox Dissolved. Theoria, 53(2-3), 121-140.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_research/256
Copyright Owner and License
Author
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.
Additional URL
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1755-2567.1987.tb00706.x