Publication Type
Journal Article
Version
acceptedVersion
Publication Date
7-2018
Abstract
In the aftermath of the 2006 and 2014 Thai coups,observers declared the resurrection of the bureaucratic polity. Bureaucrats,though, remained influential even during the period of 1992-2006, when electedpoliticians were thought to command the Thai state. Bureaucratic involvement inpolitics poses a challenge for dominant political science theories ofpolitician-bureaucrat relationships, which draw heavily from principal-agentframeworks. I apply agency theory to Thailand, testing three differenthypotheses derived from the theory. Examining legislative productivity andcontrol over bureaucratic career trajectories, I find that elected politiciansincreasingly acted as principals of the Thai state from 1992 through 2006, andto a lesser degree from 2008 to 2013. Thai bureaucrats, though, have frequentlyengaged in the political sphere, blunting political oversight and expandingtheir independence vis-à-vis politicians. This suggests that the principal-agentmodel overlooks the range of resources that bureaucracies can bring to bear indeveloping countries, granting them greater autonomy than anticipated. As such,theories of the politician-bureaucrat relationship in developing states need tobetter account for the mechanisms through which bureaucrats exercise autonomyand political influence.
Keywords
Politician-bureaucrat Relations, Agency Theory, Policy-making, Bureaucratic Politics, Thailand
Discipline
Asian Studies | Political Theory
Research Areas
Political Science
Publication
Journal of East Asian Studies -Boulder-
First Page
1
Last Page
39
ISSN
1598-2408
Identifier
10.1017/jea.2018.17
Publisher
Lynne Rienner
Citation
RICKS, Jacob.(2018). Agents, principals, or something in between? Bureaucrats and policy control in Thailand. Journal of East Asian Studies -Boulder-, , 1-39.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_research/2527
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.
Additional URL
https://doi.org/10.1017/jea.2018.17
