Publication Type

Journal Article

Version

acceptedVersion

Publication Date

7-2018

Abstract

In the aftermath of the 2006 and 2014 Thai coups,observers declared the resurrection of the bureaucratic polity. Bureaucrats,though, remained influential even during the period of 1992-2006, when electedpoliticians were thought to command the Thai state. Bureaucratic involvement inpolitics poses a challenge for dominant political science theories ofpolitician-bureaucrat relationships, which draw heavily from principal-agentframeworks. I apply agency theory to Thailand, testing three differenthypotheses derived from the theory. Examining legislative productivity andcontrol over bureaucratic career trajectories, I find that elected politiciansincreasingly acted as principals of the Thai state from 1992 through 2006, andto a lesser degree from 2008 to 2013. Thai bureaucrats, though, have frequentlyengaged in the political sphere, blunting political oversight and expandingtheir independence vis-à-vis politicians. This suggests that the principal-agentmodel overlooks the range of resources that bureaucracies can bring to bear indeveloping countries, granting them greater autonomy than anticipated. As such,theories of the politician-bureaucrat relationship in developing states need tobetter account for the mechanisms through which bureaucrats exercise autonomyand political influence.

Keywords

Politician-bureaucrat Relations, Agency Theory, Policy-making, Bureaucratic Politics, Thailand

Discipline

Asian Studies | Political Theory

Research Areas

Political Science

Publication

Journal of East Asian Studies -Boulder-

First Page

1

Last Page

39

ISSN

1598-2408

Identifier

10.1017/jea.2018.17

Publisher

Lynne Rienner

Additional URL

https://doi.org/10.1017/jea.2018.17

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