Publication Type
Journal Article
Version
publishedVersion
Publication Date
5-2018
Abstract
The agent-relative/agent-neutral distinction is one of the most important incontemporary moral theory. Yet providing an adequate formal account of it hasproven to be difficult. In this article I defend a new formal account of the distinction,one that avoids various problems faced by other accounts. My account is based on aninfluential account of the distinction developed by McNaughton and Rawling. I arguethat their approach is on the right track but that it succumbs to two seriousobjections. I then show how to formulate a new account that follows the key insightsof McNaughton and Rawling’s approach yet avoids the two objections.
Keywords
agent-neutral, agent-relative, moral rules, ensuring, maximizing
Discipline
Sociology | Theory and Philosophy
Research Areas
Humanities
Publication
Australasian Journal of Philosophy
First Page
1
Last Page
12
ISSN
0004-8402
Identifier
10.1080/00048402.2018.1477166
Publisher
Taylor & Francis (Routledge): SSH Titles
Citation
HAMMERTON, Matthew.(2018). Distinguishing agent-relativity from agent neutrality. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, , 1-12.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_research/2504
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.
Additional URL
https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2018.1477166