Valuable Asymmetrical Friendships

Publication Type

Journal Article

Publication Date

9-2016

Abstract

Aristotle distinguishes friendships of pleasure or utility from more valuable ‘character friendships’ in which the friend cares for the other qua person for the other’s own sake. Aristotle and some neo-Aristotelians require such friends to be fairly strictly symmetrical in their separateness of identity from each other, in the degree to which they identify with each other, and in the degree to which they are virtuous. We argue that there is a neglected form of valuable friendship–neither of friendship nor utility–that allows significant asymmetries. We know of no sustained discussion of such ‘asymmetrical’ friendships in the literature.

Discipline

Philosophy

Research Areas

Humanities

Publication

Philosophy

Volume

92

Issue

1

ISSN

0031-8191

Identifier

10.1017/S0031819116000395

Publisher

Cambridge University Press (CUP): HSS Journals - No Cambridge Open

Additional URL

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0031819116000395

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