Publication Type
Journal Article
Version
publishedVersion
Publication Date
3-2016
Abstract
I gave a new objection to the defeasibility theory of knowledge, namely that prohibits you from knowing that you know that p if your knowledge that p is a posteriori. Rodrigo Borges claims that Peter Klein has already satisfactorily replied to a version of my objection. He attempts to defend this reply and argues that my objection fails because a principle on which it is based is false. I show that my objection is not a version of the old one that Klein attempts (unsatisfactorily) to address, that Borges’s defence of Klein’s reply fails and that his argument against my new objection leaves it untouched.
Keywords
defeasibility, second-order knowledge, a posteriori knowledge, perceptual experience
Discipline
Philosophy
Research Areas
Humanities
Publication
Logos and Episteme: An International Journal of Epistemology
Volume
7
Issue
1
First Page
83
Last Page
94
ISSN
2069-0533
Identifier
10.5840/logos-episteme2016717
Publisher
Institutul European
Citation
WILLIAMS, John Nicholas.(2016). Still a New Problem for Defeasibility: A Rejoinder to Borges. Logos and Episteme: An International Journal of Epistemology, 7(1), 83-94.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_research/1991
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.
Additional URL
https://doi.org/10.5840/logos-episteme2016717