Publication Type
Journal Article
Version
publishedVersion
Publication Date
3-1996
Abstract
I argue that Moore's propositions, for example, 'I went to the pictures last Tuesday but I don't believe that I did' cannot be rationally believed. Their assertors either cannot be rationally believed or cannot be believed to be rational. This analysis is extended to Moorean propositions such as God knows that I am an atheist and I believe that this proposition is false. I then defend the following definition of assertion: anyone asserts that p iff that person expresses a belief that p with the intention of causing relevant epistemic change in the cognition of an actual or potential audience.
Discipline
Philosophy
Research Areas
Humanities
Publication
Australasian Journal of Philosophy
Volume
74
Issue
1
First Page
135
Last Page
149
ISSN
0004-8402
Identifier
10.1080/00048409612347111
Publisher
Taylor and Francis
Citation
WILLIAMS, John N..(1996). Moorean Absurdities and the Nature of Assertion. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 74(1), 135-149.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_research/12
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.
Additional URL
https://doi.org/10.1080/00048409612347111