Publication Type

Working Paper

Version

publishedVersion

Publication Date

8-2002

Abstract

Previous theoretical contributions on endogenous tariff formation have focused on trade models with homogeneous goods and constant returns to scale. This paper investigates the political equilibrium of trade policy when economic structure is instead characterized by differentiated products and increasing returns to scale and there exists intra-industry trade. The result shows that endogenous tariffs are positive for all industries with non-negligible shares of world production. However, the level of protection is less than the optimal tariff that would otherwise be imposed by a benevolent government in an unorganized industry, and higher in an organized industry. The protection provided to all unorganized (organized) industries increases (falls) with the relative weight the government attaches to aggregate welfare vis-`a-vis campaign contributions and falls with the fraction of the population that belongs to a lobby group. The model also indicates that the endogenous tariff level in an organized industry might be explosive. The higher is the fraction of the population represented by a lobby and the higher is the weight on aggregate welfare in the government’s objective function, the smaller is the possibility for such an explosive tariff.

Keywords

Endogenous tariff, intra-industry trade

Discipline

International Economics

Research Areas

International Economics

Volume

14-2004

First Page

1

Last Page

22

Publisher

SMU Economics and Statistics Working Paper Series, No. 14-2002

City or Country

Singapore

Copyright Owner and License

Authors

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