Publication Type

Working Paper

Version

publishedVersion

Publication Date

7-2025

Abstract

How much do contracting frictions between global firms and their suppliers impact country welfare and trade? We answer this by developing a model of global sourcing under partial contractibility, where firm-supplier relationships are exposed to a bilateral holdup problem. Sourcing decisions aggregate into a gravity equation for trade flows by organizational mode (intrafirm vs. arm’s length), which we take to structural estimation. We can then evaluate welfare changes with an extended Arkolakis, Costinot and Rodriguez-Clare (2012) formula that incorporates these contracting frictions. Our counterfactual analysis reveals a sizeable average country welfare gain of 9.2% from eliminating contracting frictions in global sourcing. We further show how accounting for these frictions significantly reshapes quantitative assessments of the welfare gains from trade, including the stakes in a US-China decoupling scenario.

Discipline

International Economics | Operations and Supply Chain Management

Research Areas

International Economics

First Page

1

Last Page

99

Identifier

10.3386/w34044

Publisher

NBER

City or Country

Cambridge, MA

Copyright Owner and License

Authors

Additional URL

https://doi.org/10.3386/w34044

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