Publication Type

Journal Article

Version

publishedVersion

Publication Date

3-2025

Abstract

We consider strategy-proof rules operating on a rich domain of preference profiles in a set up where multiple private goods have to be assigned to a set of agents with entitlements and where preferences display satiation. We show that if the rule is in addition tops-only, same-sided and individually rational with respect to the entitlements, then the preferences in the domain have to satisfy a variant of single-peakedness (referred to as multi-dimensional single-peakedness relative to the entitlements). We also provide a converse of this main finding. It turns out that this domain coincides with the one already identified in a general set up with public goods. We relate the domain of multi-dimensional single-peaked preferences relative to the entitlements to well-known restricted domains with private goods under which non-trivial and strategy-proof rules do exist.

Keywords

Strategy-proofness, Multi-dimensional single-peakedness

Discipline

Economic Theory

Research Areas

Economic Theory

Publication

Games and Economic Behavior

Volume

150

First Page

48

Last Page

70

ISSN

0899-8256

Identifier

10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.017

Publisher

Elsevier

Copyright Owner and License

Author-CC-BY

Creative Commons License

Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 License.

Additional URL

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.017

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