Publication Type
Working Paper
Version
publishedVersion
Publication Date
11-2024
Abstract
We study the design of mechanisms when the designer faces multiple plausible scenarios and is uncertain about the true scenario. A mechanism is dominated by another if the latter performs at least as well in all plausible scenarios and strictly better in at least one. A mechanism is undominated if no other feasible mechanism dominates it. We show how analyzing undominated mechanisms could be useful and illustrate the tractability of characterizing such mechanisms. This approach provides an alternative criterion for mechanism design under non-Bayesian uncertainty, complementing existing methods.
Keywords
robust mechanism design, undominated mechanisms, maxmin approrach, regret minimization, second-price auction, random reserve price
Discipline
Economic Theory
Research Areas
Economic Theory
First Page
1
Last Page
39
Publisher
Singapore Management University
Citation
BORGERS, Tilman; LI, Jiangtao; and WANG, Kexin.
Undominated mechanisms. (2024). 1-39.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2773
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.