Publication Type
Working Paper
Version
publishedVersion
Publication Date
7-2024
Abstract
We propose a combinatorial ascending auction that is “approximately” optimal, requiring minimal rationality to achieve this level of optimality, and is robust to strategic and distributional uncertainties. Specifically, the auction is rankguaranteed, meaning that for any menu M and any valuation profile, the ex-post revenue is guaranteed to be at least as high as the highest revenue achievable from feasible allocations, taking the (|M| + 1)th-highest valuation for each bundle as the price. Our analysis highlights a crucial aspect of combinatorial auction design, namely, the design of menus. We provide simple and sufficient menus in various settings.
Discipline
Economic Theory
Research Areas
Economic Theory
First Page
1
Last Page
25
Embargo Period
7-30-2024
Citation
HE, Wei; LI, Jiangtao; and ZHONG, Weijie.
Rank-guaranteed auctions. (2024). 1-25.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2756
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.