Economic voting behavior: The peak-end growth rule

Publication Type

Journal Article

Publication Date

6-2024

Abstract

This paper introduces the peak-end rule to economic voting, finding that voters focus on peak and end economic growth when evaluating incumbents. Cross-national data from 595 elections in 70 countries (1960-2020) shows that the average of the highest GDP growth rate during the term and the growth rate in the election year positively impacts incumbent vote share, with peak growth having a stronger effect. Instrumental variable analysis addresses endogeneity. Heterogeneity analysis reveals that less-educated voters rely more on the peak-end rule. The findings contribute to understanding voters' behavioral patterns and improving democratic accountability.

Keywords

cross-national, economic voting, election, myopic, peak-end rule, voter rationality

Discipline

Political Economy | Social Influence and Political Communication

Publication

Economics and Politics

ISSN

0954-1985

Identifier

10.1111/ecpo.12299

Publisher

Wiley: 24 months

Additional URL

https://doi.org/10.1111/ecpo.12299

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