Publication Type
Working Paper
Version
publishedVersion
Publication Date
11-2023
Abstract
This paper presents an analysis of a dynamic evolution model of institutions, focusing on the factors affecting the security of property rights such as coercive capacity, political power, legal quality, and private protection. These factors are endogenously determined in equilibrium, allowing legal quality to serve as a summary indicator of property security. The primary finding of the study indicates that the legal protection of property rights tends to increase over time, driven by a decline in the economy's vulnerability to expropriation, particularly due to the growing importance of commercial and industrial activities relative to agriculture. Furthermore, the coexistence of the rule of law and a strong government is contingent upon the collective capability of common people to defend themselves against state predation. These predictions align with broad historical evidence, providing insights into the evolution of institutions and the dynamics of property rights security.
Keywords
Property Rights, Coercion, Political Regime, Legal Development, Democratization, Factor Composition, Rent Seeking
Discipline
Economic Theory
Research Areas
Economic Theory
Embargo Period
4-9-2024
Citation
Huang, Fali.
Legal protection of property rights: A dynamic evolution model. (2023).
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2737
Copyright Owner and License
Singapore Management University
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.