Publication Type

Working Paper

Version

publishedVersion

Publication Date

11-2023

Abstract

This paper presents an analysis of a dynamic evolution model of institutions, focusing on the factors affecting the security of property rights such as coercive capacity, political power, legal quality, and private protection. These factors are endogenously determined in equilibrium, allowing legal quality to serve as a summary indicator of property security. The primary finding of the study indicates that the legal protection of property rights tends to increase over time, driven by a decline in the economy's vulnerability to expropriation, particularly due to the growing importance of commercial and industrial activities relative to agriculture. Furthermore, the coexistence of the rule of law and a strong government is contingent upon the collective capability of common people to defend themselves against state predation. These predictions align with broad historical evidence, providing insights into the evolution of institutions and the dynamics of property rights security.

Keywords

Property Rights, Coercion, Political Regime, Legal Development, Democratization, Factor Composition, Rent Seeking

Discipline

Economic Theory

Research Areas

Economic Theory

Embargo Period

4-9-2024

Copyright Owner and License

Singapore Management University

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