Publication Type
Working Paper
Version
publishedVersion
Publication Date
3-2024
Abstract
We consider a robust version of monopoly pricing when the seller only knows the bound on valuations and the mean of the distribution of the buyer’s value. The seller seeks to minimize interim regret, the forgone expected revenue due to not knowing the distribution of the buyer’s value. The optimal pricing policy randomizes over a range of prices; the support of the pricing policy is bounded away from zero.
Keywords
Robust mechanism design, distributional uncertainty, interim regret, regret minimization
Discipline
Economic Theory
Research Areas
Economic Theory
First Page
1
Last Page
25
Embargo Period
3-26-2024
Citation
HE, Wei; Li, Jiangtao; and WANG, Kexin.
Interim regret minimization. (2024). 1-25.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2733
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.