Publication Type

Journal Article

Version

acceptedVersion

Publication Date

9-2023

Abstract

This paper investigates rationalizable implementation of social choice functions (SCFs) in incomplete information environments. We identify weak interim rationalizable monotonicity (weak IRM) as a novel condition and show it to be a necessary and almost sufficient condition for rationalizable implementation. We show by means of robust examples that interim rationalizable monotonicity (IRM), found in the literature, is strictly stronger than weak IRM and that IRM is not necessary for rationalizable implementation, as had been previously claimed. These examples also demonstrate that Bayesian monotonicity, the key condition for full Bayesian implementation, is not necessary for rationalizable implementation. That is, rationalizable implementation can be more permissive than Bayesian implementation. We revisit well-studied classes of economic environments and show that the SCFs considered there are interim rationalizable implementable. A comprehensive discussion of related issues, including well-behaved mechanisms, mechanisms satisfying the best response property, double implementation, and responsive SCFs is also provided.

Keywords

Bayesian incentive compatibility, Bayesian monotonicity, weak interim rationalizable monotonicity, interim rationalizable monotonicity, implementation, rationalizability

Discipline

Economic Theory

Research Areas

Economic Theory

Publication

Mathematics of Operations Research

First Page

1

Last Page

34

ISSN

0364-765X

Identifier

10.1287/moor.2022.0202

Publisher

Institute for Operations Research and Management Sciences

Copyright Owner and License

Authors

Additional URL

https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.2022.0202

Download

Share

COinS