Publication Type
Journal Article
Version
publishedVersion
Publication Date
2-2023
Abstract
We develop a new class of two-stage mechanisms, which fully implement any social choice function under initial rationalizability in complete information environments. We show theoretically that our Simultaneous Report (SR) mechanisms are robust to small amounts of incomplete information about the state of nature. We also highlight the robustness of the mechanisms to a wide variety of reasoning processes and behavioral assumptions. We show experimentally that a SR mechanism performs well in inducing truth-telling in both complete and incomplete information environments and that it can induce efficient investment in a two-sided hold-up problem with ex-ante investment. The SR mechanism also outperforms a variety of other mechanisms proposed in the literature in terms of both efficiency and truth-telling rates and individuals are willing to use the mechanism when given the choice.
Keywords
Implementation Theory, Incomplete Contracts, Experiments
Discipline
Economic Theory | Political Economy
Research Areas
Economic Theory
Publication
Journal of Political Economy
Volume
131
Issue
2
First Page
285
Last Page
387
ISSN
0022-3808
Identifier
10.1086/721153
Publisher
University of Chicago Press
Citation
CHEN, Yi-Chun; HOLDEN, Richard; KUNIMOTO, Takashi; SUN, Yifei; and WILKENING, Tom.
Getting dynamic implementation to work. (2023). Journal of Political Economy. 131, (2), 285-387.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2673
Copyright Owner and License
Authors
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.
Additional URL
https://doi.org/10.1086/721153