Publication Type

Journal Article

Version

publishedVersion

Publication Date

2-2023

Abstract

We develop a new class of two-stage mechanisms, which fully implement any social choice function under initial rationalizability in complete information environments. We show theoretically that our Simultaneous Report (SR) mechanisms are robust to small amounts of incomplete information about the state of nature. We also highlight the robustness of the mechanisms to a wide variety of reasoning processes and behavioral assumptions. We show experimentally that a SR mechanism performs well in inducing truth-telling in both complete and incomplete information environments and that it can induce efficient investment in a two-sided hold-up problem with ex-ante investment. The SR mechanism also outperforms a variety of other mechanisms proposed in the literature in terms of both efficiency and truth-telling rates and individuals are willing to use the mechanism when given the choice.

Keywords

Implementation Theory, Incomplete Contracts, Experiments

Discipline

Economic Theory | Political Economy

Research Areas

Economic Theory

Publication

Journal of Political Economy

Volume

131

Issue

2

First Page

285

Last Page

387

ISSN

0022-3808

Identifier

10.1086/721153

Publisher

University of Chicago Press

Copyright Owner and License

Authors

Additional URL

https://doi.org/10.1086/721153

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