Publication Type

Journal Article

Version

submittedVersion

Publication Date

1-2023

Abstract

Non-dictatorial preference domains allow the design of unanimous social choice functions (henceforth, rules) that are non-dictatorial and strategy-proof. On a class of preference domains called unidimensional domains, we show that the unique seconds property characterizes all non-dictatorial domains. Subsequently, we provide an exhaustive classification of all non-dictatorial, unidimensional domains, based on a simple property of two-voter rules called invariance. The domains constituting the classification are semi-single-peaked domains and semi-hybrid domains (introduced here) which are two appropriate weakenings of single-peaked domains and shown to allow strategy-proof rules to depend on non-peak information of voters' preferences; the canonical strategy-proof rules for these domains are projection rules and hybrid rules respectively. As a refinement of the classification, single-peaked domains and hybrid domains emerge as the only unidimensional domains that force strategy-proof rules to be determined completely by preference peaks.

Keywords

Strategy-proofness, Invariance, Unidimensional domains, Semi-single-peaked preference, Semi-hybrid preference

Discipline

Economic Theory

Research Areas

Economic Theory

Publication

Games and Economic Behavior

Volume

137

First Page

228

Last Page

269

ISSN

0899-8256

Identifier

10.1016/j.geb.2022.11.006

Publisher

Elsevier

Additional URL

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2022.11.006

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