Publication Type

Journal Article

Version

publishedVersion

Publication Date

6-2026

Abstract

A social choice function (SCF) is said to be Nash implementable (in pure strategies) if there exists a mechanism in which every pure-strategy Nash equilibrium induces outcomes specified by the SCF. The main objective of this paper is to assess the impact of considering mixed-strategy equilibria in Nash implementation. We define compelling Nash implementation as a case where the implementing mechanism possesses a pure-strategy equilibrium that strictly Pareto dominates any undesired mixed-strategy equilibrium. We show that if the finite environment and the SCF to be implemented jointly satisfy what we call Condition COM, then we can construct a finite mechanism which compellingly implements the SCF. We also identify a class of voting environments that satisfies Condition COM, extend Condition COM to accommodate social choice correspondences, and explore a preliminary stability-based justification for the implementing mechanism. Our mechanism has several desirable features: transfers are completely dispensable; only finite mechanisms are considered; integer games are not invoked; and agents’ attitudes toward risk do not affect implementation.

Keywords

Compelling implementation, Mechanisms, Mixed strategies, Nash equilibrium

Discipline

Economic Theory

Research Areas

Economic Theory

Publication

Games and Economic Behavior

Volume

158

First Page

35

Last Page

62

ISSN

0899-8256

Identifier

10.1016/j.geb.2026.02.008

Publisher

Elsevier

Copyright Owner and License

Authors

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