"Mechanism design by observant and informed planners" by Shurojit CHATTERJI and Arunava SEN
 

Publication Type

Journal Article

Version

acceptedVersion

Publication Date

1-2022

Abstract

We study the mechanism design problem where the planner can observe ex-post the first-ranked alternatives or peaks of voter preferences. We contrast this with the design problem where the planner has ex-ante information regarding the peaks of voter preferences.

Keywords

Local strategy-proofness, strategy-proofness, unanimity

Discipline

Economic Theory

Research Areas

Applied Microeconomics

Publication

Review of Economic Design

Volume

26

Issue

4

First Page

665

Last Page

677

ISSN

1434-4742

Identifier

10.1007/s10058-021-00281-4

Publisher

Springer (part of Springer Nature): Springer Open Choice Hybrid Journals

Copyright Owner and License

Authors

Additional URL

https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-021-00281-4

Plum Print visual indicator of research metrics
PlumX Metrics
  • Usage
    • Downloads: 25
    • Abstract Views: 18
  • Captures
    • Readers: 5
see details

Share

COinS