Publication Type
Journal Article
Version
acceptedVersion
Publication Date
1-2022
Abstract
We study the mechanism design problem where the planner can observe ex-post the first-ranked alternatives or peaks of voter preferences. We contrast this with the design problem where the planner has ex-ante information regarding the peaks of voter preferences.
Keywords
Local strategy-proofness, strategy-proofness, unanimity
Discipline
Economic Theory
Research Areas
Applied Microeconomics
Publication
Review of Economic Design
Volume
26
Issue
4
First Page
665
Last Page
677
ISSN
1434-4742
Identifier
10.1007/s10058-021-00281-4
Publisher
Springer (part of Springer Nature): Springer Open Choice Hybrid Journals
Citation
CHATTERJI, Shurojit and SEN, Arunava.
Mechanism design by observant and informed planners. (2022). Review of Economic Design. 26, (4), 665-677.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2595
Copyright Owner and License
Authors
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.
Additional URL
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-021-00281-4