Publication Type
Working Paper
Version
publishedVersion
Publication Date
6-2021
Abstract
We analyze the role of competition in information provision in random search markets. Multiple symmetric senders compete for the receiver’s investment by disclosing information about their respective project qualities, and the receiver conducts random search to learn about the qualities of the projects. We show that in any symmetric Nash equilibrium, each sender chooses a strategy with the lowest possible reservation value. The receiver does not benefit from the competition of the senders, as the receiver’s expected payoff does not change when the number of senders increases.
Discipline
Economic Theory
Research Areas
Economic Theory
Citation
HE, Wei and LI, Jiangtao.
Competitive information disclosure in random search markets. (2021).
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2495
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.