Publication Type
Working Paper
Version
publishedVersion
Publication Date
4-2023
Abstract
We define notions of dominance between two actions in a dynamic game. Local dominance considers players who have a blurred view of the future and compare the two actions by first focusing on the outcomes that may realize at the current stage. When considering the possibility that the game may continue, they can only check that the local comparison is not overturned under the assumption of "continuing in the same way" after the two actions (in a newly defined sense). Despite the lack of forward planning, local dominance solves dynamic mechanisms that were found easy to play and implements social choice functions that cannot be implemented in obviously-dominant strategies.
Keywords
Weak dominance, obvious dominance, strategy-proofness, implementation
Discipline
Economic Theory
Research Areas
Economic Theory
First Page
1
Last Page
46
Publisher
SMU Economics and Statistics Working Paper Series, Paper No. 01-2021
City or Country
Singapore
Citation
CATONINI, Emiliano and XUE, Jingyi.
Local dominance. (2023). 1-46.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2491
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.