Publication Type

Working Paper

Version

publishedVersion

Publication Date

4-2023

Abstract

We define notions of dominance between two actions in a dynamic game. Local dominance considers players who have a blurred view of the future and compare the two actions by first focusing on the outcomes that may realize at the current stage. When considering the possibility that the game may continue, they can only check that the local comparison is not overturned under the assumption of "continuing in the same way" after the two actions (in a newly defined sense). Despite the lack of forward planning, local dominance solves dynamic mechanisms that were found easy to play and implements social choice functions that cannot be implemented in obviously-dominant strategies.

Keywords

Weak dominance, obvious dominance, strategy-proofness, implementation

Discipline

Economic Theory

Research Areas

Economic Theory

First Page

1

Last Page

46

Publisher

SMU Economics and Statistics Working Paper Series, Paper No. 01-2021

City or Country

Singapore

Share

COinS