Publication Type
Journal Article
Version
acceptedVersion
Publication Date
11-2020
Abstract
We investigate the testable implications of the theory of stable matchings in two-sided matching markets with one-sided preferences. Our main result connects the revealed preference analysis to the well-known lattice structure of the set of stable matchings, and tests the rationalizability of a data set by analyzing the joins and meets of matchings.
Keywords
Lattice structure, One-sided preferences, Revealed preference, Stable matchings
Discipline
Economic Theory
Research Areas
Economic Theory
Publication
Games and Economic Behavior
Volume
124
First Page
305
Last Page
318
ISSN
0899-8256
Identifier
10.1016/j.geb.2020.08.015
Publisher
Elsevier
Embargo Period
5-10-2021
Citation
HU, Gaoji; LI, Jiangtao; and TANG, Rui.
The revealed preference theory of stable matchings with one-sided preferences. (2020). Games and Economic Behavior. 124, 305-318.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2472
Copyright Owner and License
Authors
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.
Additional URL
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2020.08.015