Publication Type

Journal Article

Version

submittedVersion

Publication Date

11-2019

Abstract

A new condition, which we call uniform monotonicity, is shown to be necessary and almost sufficient for rationalizable implementation of corre-spondences. Uniform monotonicity is much weaker than Maskin monotonic-ity and reduces to it in the case of functions. Maskin monotonicity, the key condition for Nash implementation, had also been shown to be necessary for rationalizable implementation of social choice functions. Our conclusion is that the conditions for rationalizable implementation are not only starkly different from, but also much weaker than those for Nash implementation, when we consider social choice correspondences. Thus, dropping rational ex-pectations significantly expands the class of rules that can be decentralizedby communication-based economic institutions.

Keywords

Complete information, implementation, Maskin monotonicity, rationalizability, uniform monotonicity, social choice correspondence

Discipline

Economic Theory

Research Areas

Economic Theory

Publication

Mathematics of Operations Research

Volume

44

Issue

4

First Page

1326

Last Page

1344

ISSN

0364-765X

Publisher

INFORMS (Institute for Operations Research and Management Sciences)

Embargo Period

4-29-2021

Copyright Owner and License

Authors

Additional URL

https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.2018.0972

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