Publication Type
Journal Article
Version
submittedVersion
Publication Date
11-2019
Abstract
A new condition, which we call uniform monotonicity, is shown to be necessary and almost sufficient for rationalizable implementation of corre-spondences. Uniform monotonicity is much weaker than Maskin monotonic-ity and reduces to it in the case of functions. Maskin monotonicity, the key condition for Nash implementation, had also been shown to be necessary for rationalizable implementation of social choice functions. Our conclusion is that the conditions for rationalizable implementation are not only starkly different from, but also much weaker than those for Nash implementation, when we consider social choice correspondences. Thus, dropping rational ex-pectations significantly expands the class of rules that can be decentralizedby communication-based economic institutions.
Keywords
Complete information, implementation, Maskin monotonicity, rationalizability, uniform monotonicity, social choice correspondence
Discipline
Economic Theory
Research Areas
Economic Theory
Publication
Mathematics of Operations Research
Volume
44
Issue
4
First Page
1326
Last Page
1344
ISSN
0364-765X
Publisher
INFORMS (Institute for Operations Research and Management Sciences)
Embargo Period
4-29-2021
Citation
KUNIMOTO, Takashi and SERRANO, Roberto.
Rationalizable implementation of correspondences. (2019). Mathematics of Operations Research. 44, (4), 1326-1344.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2467
Copyright Owner and License
Authors
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.
Additional URL
https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.2018.0972