Publication Type
Working Paper
Version
publishedVersion
Publication Date
12-2020
Abstract
We consider strategy-proof rules operating on a rich domain of preference profiles in a set up where multiple private goods have to be assigned to a set of agents with entitlements where preferences display satiation. We show that if the rule is in addition "desirable", in that it is tops-only, continuous, same-sided and individually rational with respect to the entitlements, then the preferences in the domain have to satisfy a variant of single-peakedness (referred to as smilattice single-peakedness). We also provide a converse of this main finding. It turns our that this domain coincides with the one already identified in a general set up with a public good. Finally we relate semilattice single-peaked domains to well-known restricted domains under which strategy-proof and desirable rules do exist.
Keywords
Strategy-proofness, semilattice single peakedness
Discipline
Economic Theory
Research Areas
Economic Theory
First Page
1
Last Page
34
Publisher
Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 1112
City or Country
Osaka
Citation
CHATTERJI, Shurojit; MASSO Jordi; and SERIZAWA Shigehiro.
On strategy-proofness and the salience of single-peakedness in a private goods economy. (2020). 1-34.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2459
Copyright Owner and License
Authors
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.