A Ricardian rationale for the WTO rules on R&D subsidies

Author

Yumi KOH, Singapore Management UniversityFollow
Gea M. LEE, Singapore Management UniversityFollow

Publication Type

Journal Article

Version

acceptedVersion

Publication Date

11-2020

Abstract

The WTO subsidy rules use two key criteria, specificity and adverse effects, to regulate R&D subsidies. Using the model of Dornbusch et al. (1977), we offer a Ricardian rationale for the regulatory criteria.

Keywords

SCM Agreement, R&D subsidies, Beggar-thy-neighbor policies

Discipline

International Economics

Research Areas

International Economics

Publication

Economics Letters

Volume

196

First Page

1

Last Page

5

ISSN

0165-1765

Identifier

10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109500

Publisher

Elsevier

Citation

KOH, Yumi and LEE, Gea M.. A Ricardian rationale for the WTO rules on R&D subsidies. (2020). Economics Letters. 196, 1-5.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2454

Copyright Owner and License

Authors

Creative Commons License

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.

Additional URL

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109500