Publication Type

Journal Article

Version

acceptedVersion

Publication Date

11-2020

Abstract

Artemov, Kunimoto, and Serrano (2013a,b, henceforth, AKS) study a mechanism design problem where arbitrary restrictions are placed on the set of first-order beliefs of agents. Calling these restrictions Δ, they adopt Δ-rationalizability (Battigalli and Siniscalchi, 2003) and show that Δ-incentive compatibility and Δ-measurability are necessary and sufficient conditions for robust virtual implementation, which implies that virtual implementation is possible uniformly over all type spaces consistent with Δ-restrictions. By appropriately defining Δ in order to restrict attention to complete information environments and thereafter explicitly modelling the assumption of complete information in the language of type spaces, I re-establish the permissive implementation result of Abreu and Matsushima (1992a). However, AKS need to fix a complete information environment throughout their analysis and therefore does not enable us to ask if robust virtual implementation results are “robust” to the relaxation of the complete information environment. The main result of this paper shows that permissive robust virtual implementation results can be extended to nearby incomplete information environments. I also obtain a tight connection between the class of nearby incomplete information environments considered by this paper and that considered by Oury and Tercieux (2012).

Keywords

Complete information, first-order belief, incentive compatibility, measurability, robust virtual implementation, rationalizable strategies

Discipline

Economic Theory

Research Areas

Economic Theory

Publication

Mathematical Social Sciences

Volume

108

First Page

62

Last Page

73

ISSN

0165-4896

Identifier

10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2020.09.001

Publisher

Elsevier

Copyright Owner and License

Authors

Additional URL

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2020.09.001

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