Publication Type
Working Paper
Version
publishedVersion
Publication Date
10-2020
Abstract
We provide an exhaustive classification of all preference domains that allow the design of unanimous social choice functions (henceforth, rules) that are non-dictatorial and strategy-proof. This taxonomy is based on a richness assumption and employs a simple property of two-voter rules called invariance. The preference domains that form the classification are semi-single-peaked domains (introduced by Chatterji et al. (2013)) and semi-hybrid domains (introduced here) which are two appropriate weakenings of the single-peaked domains, and which, more importantly, are shown to allow strategy-proof rules to depend on non-peak information of voters’ preferences. As a refinement of the classification, single-peaked domains and hybrid domains emerge as the only preference domains that force strategy-proof rules to be determined completely by the peaks of voters’ preferences. We also provide characterization results for strategy-proof rules on these domains.
Keywords
Strategy-proofness, invariance, path-connectedness, (semi)-single-peaked preference, (semi)-hybrid preference
Discipline
Economic Theory | Taxation
Research Areas
Economic Theory
First Page
1
Last Page
129
Publisher
SMU Economics and Statistics Working Paper Series, Paper No. 22-2020
Citation
CHATTERJI, Shurojit and ZENG, Huaxia.
A taxonomy of non-dictatorial domains. (2020). 1-129.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2408
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.