Publication Type

Working Paper

Version

publishedVersion

Publication Date

10-2020

Abstract

We provide an exhaustive classification of all preference domains that allow the design of unanimous social choice functions (henceforth, rules) that are non-dictatorial and strategy-proof. This taxonomy is based on a richness assumption and employs a simple property of two-voter rules called invariance. The preference domains that form the classification are semi-single-peaked domains (introduced by Chatterji et al. (2013)) and semi-hybrid domains (introduced here) which are two appropriate weakenings of the single-peaked domains, and which, more importantly, are shown to allow strategy-proof rules to depend on non-peak information of voters’ preferences. As a refinement of the classification, single-peaked domains and hybrid domains emerge as the only preference domains that force strategy-proof rules to be determined completely by the peaks of voters’ preferences. We also provide characterization results for strategy-proof rules on these domains.

Keywords

Strategy-proofness, invariance, path-connectedness, (semi)-single-peaked preference, (semi)-hybrid preference

Discipline

Economic Theory | Taxation

Research Areas

Economic Theory

First Page

1

Last Page

129

Publisher

SMU Economics and Statistics Working Paper Series, Paper No. 22-2020

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