Publication Type
Working Paper
Version
publishedVersion
Publication Date
10-2020
Abstract
This paper investigates rationalizable implementation of social choice functions (SCFs) in incomplete information environments. We identify weak interim rationalizable monotonicity (weak IRM) as a novel condition and show that weak IRM is a necessary and almost sufficient condition for rationalizable implementation. We show by means of an example that interim rationalizable monotonicity (IRM), found in the literature, is strictly stronger than weak IRM as its name suggests, and that IRM is not necessary for rationalizable implementation, as had been previously claimed. The same example also demonstrates that Bayesian monotonicity, the key condition for full Bayesian implementation, is not necessary for rationalizable implementation. This implies that rationalizable implementation can be more permissive than Bayesian implementation: one can exploit the fact that there are no mixed Bayesian equilibria in the implementing mechanism.
Keywords
Bayesian incentive compatibility, Bayesian monotonicity, weak interim rationalizable monotonicity, interim rationalizable monotonicity, implementation, rationalizability.
Discipline
Economic Theory
Research Areas
Economic Theory
First Page
1
Last Page
51
Publisher
SMU Economics and Statistics Working Paper Series, Paper No. 21-2020
City or Country
Singapore
Citation
KUNIMOTO, Takashi; SARAN, Rene; and SERRANO, Roberto.
Interim rationalizable implementation of functions. (2020). 1-51.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2406
Copyright Owner and License
Authors
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.
Comments
Published in Mathematics of Operations Research (2023) DOI: 10.1287/moor.2022.0202