Publication Type
Working Paper
Version
publishedVersion
Publication Date
1-2020
Abstract
We study Random Social Choice Functions (or RSCFs) in a standard ordinal mech-anism design model. We introduce a new preference domain called a hybrid domain which includes as special cases as the complete domain and the single-peaked domain. We characterize the class of unanimous and strategy-proof RSCFs on these domains and refer to them as Restricted Probabilistic Fixed Ballot Rules (or RPFBRs). These RSCFs are not necessarily decomposable, i.e., cannot be written as a convex combina-tion of their deterministic counterparts. We identify a necessary and sufficient condition under which decomposability holds for anonymous RPFBRs. Finally, we provide an axiomatic justification of hybrid domains and show that every connected domain satis-fying some mild conditions is a hybrid domain where the RPFBR characterization still prevails.
Keywords
Strategy-proofness, hybrid domain, restricted probabilistic fixed ballot rule, decomposability; connectedness
Discipline
Economic Theory
Research Areas
Economic Theory
First Page
1
Last Page
39
Publisher
SMU Economics and Statistics Working Paper Series, Paper No. 03-2020
Citation
CHATTERJI, Shurojit; ROY, Souvik; SADHUKHAN, Soumyarup; SEN, Arunava; and ZENG, Huaxia.
Restricted probabilistic fixed ballot rules and hybrid domains. (2020). 1-39.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2342
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.