Publication Type

Working Paper

Version

publishedVersion

Publication Date

1-2020

Abstract

We study Random Social Choice Functions (or RSCFs) in a standard ordinal mech-anism design model. We introduce a new preference domain called a hybrid domain which includes as special cases as the complete domain and the single-peaked domain. We characterize the class of unanimous and strategy-proof RSCFs on these domains and refer to them as Restricted Probabilistic Fixed Ballot Rules (or RPFBRs). These RSCFs are not necessarily decomposable, i.e., cannot be written as a convex combina-tion of their deterministic counterparts. We identify a necessary and sufficient condition under which decomposability holds for anonymous RPFBRs. Finally, we provide an axiomatic justification of hybrid domains and show that every connected domain satis-fying some mild conditions is a hybrid domain where the RPFBR characterization still prevails.

Keywords

Strategy-proofness, hybrid domain, restricted probabilistic fixed ballot rule, decomposability; connectedness

Discipline

Economic Theory

Research Areas

Economic Theory

First Page

1

Last Page

39

Publisher

SMU Economics and Statistics Working Paper Series, Paper No. 03-2020

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